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Abstract 
In the scientific realism debate, various positions in their defense against the challenge from  
history of science (pessimistic induction (PI) articulated by Laudan) participate in three different  
levels of discourse. Firstly, thinkers talk about particular historical episodes of theory change and  
pick out the revision defiant constituents in them. They point to certain entities with their  
properties or certain equations. Secondly, the talk climbs to a level where general terms such as  
‘structure’, ‘entity’, ‘concrete structure’ etc are employed. Thinkers at this level argue for  
revision-defiance in terms of such general terms rather than historical examples involving  
concrete cases. Thirdly, they elevate their discussion to the metaphysics of properties and  
relations. The debate’s focus here is about the property, intrinsic or relational, that has a stake in  
the architecture of reality and the ontological priority of one over the other. I argue that these  
three discourses are connected in an interesting way and that all the positions in the debate face a  
peculiar epistemological weakness in trying to evade PI by lounging solutions from any of the  
three levels. 
Extended Abstract 
What is the stuff by which successful theories are  hooked on-to-the world- or  are there 
any  constituents in past theories by virtue of which they were successful? This is the central 
concern,  based on which most of the debate over scientific realism is carried out today. Selective  
skepticisms, in their attempt to evade the charge leveled by Laudan (pessimistic induction (PI))  
respond in the following way. They claim that past theories were successful precisely because  
some ‘reality-hitting’ constituents were in them, whose descriptions were  ‘truth-bearing’.  I  
identify three different levels of discourse in the scientific realism-debate with regard to PI. I  
argue that identifying the above discourses brings into light a peculiar epistemological weakness  
in all these positions in the attempt to dodge under PI. Most selective skeptics and scientific 
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realists in  their defense against PI, engage in  a  discourse which is largely a talk about 
‘particular entities’ or certain ‘equations’ which survivedtheory change. In other words, they talk 
about examples of historical episodes where certain  entities or equations resisted theory-change. 
I call this the theory-talk, where thinkers identify  certain  entities such as electrons or some  
differential  equations  occurring in specific theories  responsible for truth-preservation. A rough 
example would be Hacking,  who elucidates his  position with the case of ‘electron’. Similarly, 
Worrall attempts to explain his position by noting  the equations involved in the Fresnel-
Maxwell theory-change. Realists like Psillos, in defending  his position against PI, engage in  
theory-talk when he argues that certain constituents in the  theory are revision-defiant, that they 
can be singled out by their roles in respective predictive  successes. But this need not be just an 
equation or an entity. For example, the spin or charge of a  particular particle may be ascribed to 
have preserved truth across theory-change. It could be any  constituent of the theory. Psillos 
sanctions such a discourse where the task of the scientific realist  is to talk about truth-bearing 
constituents in particular past failed theories. Further he suggests a  naturalistic program where 
current practicing scientists are  in a position to pick truth-bearing  constituents from past 
theories in their respective subject area. In theory-talk, philosophers focus  on particular 
historical contexts  of theory-change  and expose components responsible for the  success of 
theories which were later abandoned. Examples discussed by selective skeptics like  Hacking and 
Worrall are instances of theory-talk. However, the criticism of rationalization post  hoc raised by 
Chakravartty is applicable to all theory-talk as the current standards of rationality  or perspective 
of the present is used in analyzing past episodes of theory-change. 
At a different level, the debate is carried out with a unique terminology. This, I identify  
as  happening at  a higher level. Thinkers employ  terms such as  ‘structure’ and  ‘entities’ 
(content/nature), rather  than  particular differential equations (or  particular entities such as  
electrons) and argue that they are the revision-defiant constituents. I consider this endorsement of 
a  meta-level terminology as  meta-theory-talk. Selective skeptics  and realists both  engage in  
meta-theory-talk (‘structure’, ‘entity’, ‘concrete structure’ and ‘structure-nature continuum’) in  
defending their position against PI. Psillos metaphorically defends his position by saying that  
there is a  structure-nature continuum in scientific theories, and  that  it is not possible to  
differentiate structure and nature from theoretical descriptions. Semirealism is an appeal to the  
idea of  concrete structure which  contains knowledge of causal properties of  particulars and  
relations between them. Here, the scientific realism-debate is all about the stuff that is 
revisiondefiant, be it structure,  entity, concrete structure or some parts of the theory which are 
both  (structure-mature continuum). The debate is  not about the particular equation or entity in 
the  specific theory in  a particular historical context. It is about whether the upshot obtained 
from  such examples in history that ‘something is retained’ can be stretched to all instances of 
theorychange. Precisely for this reason, they employ meta-level terms in order to climb to this 
higher level. In this level of discourse, thinkers are definitely inspired by particular historical 
contexts  such as the case of electrons or Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s equations in their theories of 
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light. But  they move ahead from the theory-talk to a talk about structures and entities, which 
according to  them preserve truth.  
At a third level, thinkers are interested in the talk about a comprehensive account of the  
metaphysics of properties and relations hinted by theory-talk and meta-theory talk. According to  
structural realists, relational properties of entities are what we get right when we say that theories  
are right about  the  structure of the world. However, ontic structural realists press for the  
ontological priority of relational properties over intrinsic properties.  Scientific realists try to  
counter this stance by invoking metaphysical notions such as haeccity and quiddity and lay outan 
object-based ontology. According to them, intrinsic properties of entities are also contained in  
the knowledge provided by scientific theories which are not possible to explain away by means  
of relational properties. I call this level of discourse in the scientific realism debate as  
metaphysical-talk. The emergence of ontic structural realism catalyzed  metaphysical-talk. The  
idea  that ontology of a scientific-world can do away with the notion of entities altogether is 
entertained by the ontic structural realist. The  ontological  priority of relation over relata is a  
central question at this level of discourse. Realists root for a more traditional metaphysics which  
entertains the talk of  intrinsic properties of  entities. Scientific realism is still in search of a  
metaphysics of properties and relations that will befit their position. However semirealism, in  
accordance with the idea of concrete structure propounds an ontology deep-rooted on first order  
relational properties which account for causal interactions.  In this level of discourse, thinkers  
stretch their views on theory- talk and meta-theory-talk to metaphysical-talk. The worry whether  
the notion of structure is concrete or abstract is also entertained at this level. 
Does theory-talk about a particular equation imply meta-theory-talk about structure and  
subsequently metaphysical-talk about relational properties? This worry can also be raised in the  
case of entities (or  certain constituents that are both).  I take this question to be of utmost 
importance to the scientific realism debate. Thinkers employ arguments from  theory-talk in  
elucidating their respective positions in the  meta-theory-talk and  metaphysical-talk.  Historical  
episodes are the starting points in the defense of selective skepticisms as well as scientific  
realism against PI. Therefore, there is an epistemological dependence on  theory-talk in the  
constitution of the other two levels. This dependence is a peculiar epistemological weakness too.  
We  cannot recast a lost historical episode. Theory-talk is always susceptible to the charge that  
what is retained across theory change is what is visible from our perspective. This charge of  
rationalization post hoc is applicable to the whole of theory-talk. Further, taking the first level to  
be justifying the other is simply absurd. For example, it is simply obscure for somebody to say  
that structures are revision defiant by pointing to a particular historical example. It is equally  
absurd to say that intrinsic or relational properties are what  are obtained by mature scientific  
theories by paying attention to certain past scientific theories.  I argue that discourse in one level  
cannot be used as justification for a particular position and its  discourse in another level. 
However, these three levels if employed together, makes the various positions in the debate  
meaningful. 
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